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Tariffs and steel: US safeguard actions∗
Jared Greenville and T.Gordon MacAulay†
A multiproduct spatial equilibrium model of world steel trade is presented in this pa-
per. The model is used to analyse the impacts of the safeguard trade barriers brought
about by the USA in order to protect their domestic industry from the so-called unfair
competition. Emphasis is placed on the likely effect on the Australian industry and
possible policy responses available to the industry. A case study is made of Australia’s
three largest export products; namely, slab, hot-rolled and cold-rolled steel, which share
some substitutability in supply and demand because of the nature of the industry. As
a result of the safeguard barriers to steel trade, world steel prices fell and trade shifted
away from the USA to other importing regions.




structural reform rarely succeed because of a lack of consideration given to other
sectors of the economy. The beneﬁts from trade to both importing and exporting
countriesaresigniﬁcant,withmanycountriesadvocatingfreetradetoachievemaximal
beneﬁts. It is, therefore, surprising that a country such as the USA, a supporter of free
trade in the manufacturing sector, has advocated a policy restricting trade to achieve
a domestic policy outcome.
On 6 March 2002, President George W. Bush announced a series of punitive bar-
riers on steel imported into the USA. The measures included a range of tariffs on
processed steel products, which had the potential to affect Australia’s exports to the
USA by $US400 million (Davis and Collins 2002). For Australia, the USA represents
the largest export market (Ferber 2002). Australia’s largest steel export to the USA
– slab steel which represent 50percent of total exports – was relatively unaffected
with the implementation of a global tariff-free quota of 5.4 million tonnes. A conces-
sion on Australian hot-rolled steel products (Australia’s second largest steel export)
was granted with 250kt of exports exempted from the new barriers. Recently, the
World Trade Organization has ruled the safeguard measures illegal; however, the US
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government has rejected the ﬁnding. It is unclear whether the USA will remove the
tariffs, or face retaliation from steel exporting nations.
President Bush blamed trade-distorting subsidies from steel-producing nations for
the increase in imports to the USA. Bush reasoned that the subsidies provided to
overseas steel producers have led to excess capacity in the global steel industry, with
excessstocksbeing‘dumped’ontheUSmarket(Bush2002).Thetemporaryprotection
measureswereaimedatrestoringmarketforcesintheUSsteelmarket,allowingtheUS
steel producers to restructure their operations. The plan included a retraining package
and assistance to help ﬁrms with health care costs, a major source of inefﬁciency in the
steel industry (Bush 2002).
The aim of this paper is to report how the US safeguard tariffs and quotas have
affected the importation of steel products from Australia and other world steel in-
dustries. This paper is a case study of the use of trade policy to achieve a domestic
policy objective. The structure of the paper is as follows: an overview of the history
and supposed motives behind the current protectionist measures imposed by the USA
is presented in section 2; in section 3, details of the spatial equilibrium used to model
the industry are given; in section 4, modelling results are presented; and policy impli-
cations are discussed in sections 5 and 6. The impacts measured are the changes in
volume and direction of trade ﬂows caused by the implementation of the barriers and
the changes in consumer and producer surplus.
2. Protection in the USA
The steel industry is comprised of different enterprises that produce ﬁnished steel mill
products and semiﬁnished slabs, blooms and billets from iron ore, steel scrap, or both
(Crandall 1981). The output takes the form of carbon, alloy, or stainless steel. Carbon
steelcomprisesthebulkofworldsteelproduction.Themajorconsumersofsteelgoods
are the construction and automotive industries (Crandall 1981).
The steel production process is described in Crandall (1981). Slab steel is a primary
form of steel.Iron oreis processed toform moltensteel, whichis used to produce slabs,
blooms and billets. Hot-rolled and cold-rolled products are ﬁnished steel products that
use slab steel and other semiﬁnished products as their input.
An integrated steel manufacturing plant uses a blast furnace to convert iron ore into
pig iron, which is then reduced to steel, typically in an oxygen blown converter. These
large plants typically use a highly unionised workforce and as part of the conditions
negotiated, pay generous beneﬁts to retired employees (Crandall 1996). These plants
in the USA face domestic and international competitive pressures. Their higher labour
and production costs have caused smaller domestic mini-mill producers and foreign
imports to capture one-quarter of the US market (Anon 2002).
A mini-mill is a steel manufacturing plant that uses scrap steel, melted down and
reformed into new hot-rolled and ﬂat steel products. Mini-mills expanded their market
share from 5percent in 1970 to 35percent in 1996 (Crandall 1996). This growth was
attributed to a sharp decline in scrap steel prices and relatively low production costs.
The cost advantage of mini-mills has arisen from two sources, lower ﬁxed costs and
lower labour costs. For the industry, the United Steelworkers Association estimates
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beneﬁts paid to union workers are close to $US1 billion annually, on average, $US9
per tonne produced (Hufbauer and Goodrich 2002). Furthermore, it is estimated that
higher capital costs incurred by integrated steel producers, mean that ﬁxed costs per
tonne of hot-rolled steel produced are $US130 for integrated producers, compared
with $US30 for mini-mills (Hufbauer and Goodrich 2002). This cost disadvantage is
partly offset by higher variable costs for mini-mills (Hufbauer and Goodrich 2002).
The USA became a net steel importer in 1959 and, with the emergence of Japan
as a major exporter of steel products, imports gained greater penetration into the US
market.From1967to1968,afallindemandforlocallyproducedsteelcausedbysupply
uncertaintyledtotheformationoftheVoluntaryRestraintAgreementswithJapanand
the European Community (Jones 1983). These agreements placed voluntary restraints
on steel exports to the USA. After the failure of the Voluntary Restraint Agreements
(see Jones 1983), the USA, in 1979, introduced the Trigger Price Mechanism, which
deﬁned a series of dumping reference prices.
In1982theTriggerPriceMechanismwasreplaced,inpart,byanagreementbetween
the European Community and the USA to limit imports into the USA (Jones 1983).
Furthermore, the USA negotiated seven new Voluntary Restraint Agreements with
importing countries in an effort to stem fears of antidumping actions by the US
producers (Howell etal. 1988).
This further intervention failed to solve the problems of the US steel industry
as imports from non-agreement nations increased (Howell etal. 1988). Government
intervention in the US steel industry can be seen as a case of policy persistence.
Continued government intervention leads to a change in decision-making as decision
makers alter their behaviour believing government support will be provided in hard
times (Coate and Morris 1999). The recent safeguard actions by the USA can be seen
as a further extension of a problem that ﬁrst appeared in the 1960s and one which has
been exacerbated by subsequent government intervention in the steel trade.
Joblossesbetween1997and2001from29USsteelﬁrms(estimatedtobe10370jobs
by Hufbauer and Goodrich 2002) and the declining importance of the steel industry
in the US economy (1.5% of workers in 1950 to 0.1% in 2002; Henwood 2002) have
placed pressure on governments to lessen the hardship from plant closures. In 2001,
the US International Trade Commission found that steel imports were causing injury
to the domestic industry, which, under Section 201 of US trade law, provides sufﬁcient
justiﬁcation for the US authorities to introduce trade barriers of any sort considered
appropriate (Maurer and Lynch 2002). The full range of trade barriers is presented in
Table 1.
3. Modelling of steel trade
Tariffs and effective quotas generally reduce the total welfare in the economy. Tariffs
raise the domestic price and provide a more favourable environment for domestic
industriestocompetewithimports(PindyckandRubinfeld1998).Tariffsaregenerally
a tax on imports.
Tariffsplacedbysmallimportingnations(thosewhichcannotinﬂuenceworldprice)
reducetotalwelfare.Tariffsgeneratedistributionaleffects.Thereisatransferofsurplus
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Table 1 Restrictions on Australian steel exports to the USA
Product Remedy Year 1 (%) Year 2 (%) Year 3 (%)
Slabs TRQ† 30 24 18
Hot-rolled coil for re-rolling by steelscape Exemption 250 kt 250 kt 250 kt
Other hot-rolled sheet and coil Tariff 30 24 18
Cold-rolled sheet and coil Tariff 30 24 18
P l a t e T a r i f f 3 02 41 8
Coated sheet Tariff 30 24 18
Tin mill products Tariff 30 24 18
Hot-rolled bar, cold-ﬁnished bar Tariff 30 24 18
Rebar Tariff 15 12 9
Certain welded tubular products Tariff 15 12 9
Stainless rod and bar Tariff 15 12 9
Stainless wire Tariff 8 7 6
Pipe and tube ﬁttings and ﬂanges Tariff 13 10 7
†TRQ, tariff rate quota; 30percent tariff applies to tonnages in excess of country quota in year 1, 24percent
in year 2 and 18percent in year 3; kt, thousand tonnes. Source: USITC and Whitehouse web sites.
fromconsumerstoproducersandfromconsumerstogovernment(tariffrevenue);both
these effects do not represent a fall in efﬁciency (Tisdell 1982). A transfer of consumer
surplus to production cost occurs along with an area of forgone surplus, as consumers
re-allocate budgets in response to changed relative prices; these represent a fall in
efﬁciency and welfare, respectively.
In the case of the steel safeguard barriers, a series of ad valorem tariffs applied. The
economic impacts and consequences of these ad valorem tariffs are similar to a ﬁxed
rate tariff. The ad valorem tariff is set as a percent of the international price, causing
high prices to be skewed away from the world price, while low prices are less affected
(Houck 1986).
AnadvaloremtariffisdepictedinFigure1.Theadvaloremtariff(θ)isappliedonthe
import price (Market A’s price). The non-tariff barrier transfer price between markets
(given costless transfer) is given by the 45◦ line. The imposition of a tariff creates a
Figure 1 Effect of an ad valorem tariff. Pw is world price, Ps is support price and other variables
as deﬁned in the text.
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wedge between the two prices, causing the price in Market B to rise, while the price
falls in Market A. Tariff revenue collected is shown by the hatched regions in Figure 1.
The revenue is collected from both markets, with the share determined by the relative
elasticities. The tariff induces change in relative prices with an increase in domestic
production at the cost of production in the exporting nation (Qd − Qa < Qc − Qb).
Furthermore, the demand quantity falls in the importing nation, yet increases in the
exporting nation.
Quotas restrict the quantity of imported product to the domestic market. With the
implementation of an effective quota, the increase in domestic price causes domestic
production to increase from the free trade level. The increase in output represents a
shift in the resources used in the domestic economy away from more efﬁcient uses,
resulting in an efﬁciency loss similar to that seen for a tariff.
An import quota has signiﬁcant external effects if the importing country is large.
The change in excess demand causes the world price to fall and the domestic price to
rise. The fall in world price and rise in domestic price means that the imposing country
is able to extract a level of quota rent from world producers. The collection of quota
revenue will be similar to that seen in Figure 1 and depends on the relative elasticities.
However, the feedback of the fall in the world price to the domestic market will not
occur.
A tariff quota (or tariff rate quota) was imposed on Australian steel exports. A tariff
quota is comprised of two parts, a ‘within-quota’ tariff and ‘out-of-quota’ tariff. The
within-quota tariff applies to the goods imported within the quota. The out-of-quota
tariff is the tariff rate applied to any goods imported over and above the set quota.
Theeffectofatariffquotawithaprohibitiveout-of-quotatariffisshowninFigure2.
A zero tariff is applied to the ﬁrst ‘quota’ units, with an out-of-quota tariff of ‘θ’( a n
ad valorem tariff), resulting in a stepped price ratio (assuming no transport costs). The


























Figure 2 Tariff rate quota (no trade over the quota setting). Di is demand in region i (i=A,
B), Si is supply in region i, P
j
w is world price and Ps is support price.
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effect on the domestic economy is the same as with a quota, with one difference. A
standard quota allows no feedback of the world price change to the domestic market;
however, with a tariff quota there is an opportunity for a change in the world price to
feedback to the domestic market. If the price were to fall below P3
w in Figure 2, some
units would be imported with the out-of-quota tariff applied. The result is a lower
domestic price and increased imports.
4. Spatial equilibrium model
A spatial equilibrium model was used to evaluate the impacts of the US safeguard
measures on steel trade. A spatial equilibrium model was ﬁrst constructed by Enke
(1951) and mathematically solved by Samuelson (1952) and Takayama and Judge
(1971).Suchmodelscanbeformulatedwitheitherpricesorquantitiesasthedependant
variables (Krishnaiah and Krishnamoorthy 1990). The approach uses either a welfare-
basedobjectivefunction,oranetrevenuefunction,whichequalszeroatthecompetitive
equilibrium. The simplest form of a spatial equilibrium model is constructed under
the assumption of perfect competition, where supply, demand and transfer costs are
known (Batterham and MacAulay 1994).
When world price is below the autarky price, the excess demand function is positive,
indicatingthatdomesticdemandisgreaterthandomesticsupply.Whentheworldprice
is above the autarky price, the excess supply function is positive, indicating that the
domestic supply is greater than demand.
Where the excess demand and supply curves intersect, the quantity and direction of
trade is determined with the ﬂow of goods from region 1 to region 2, x12 (Figure 3).
With zero transfer costs, the trade equilibrium would be given by the intersection of
the excess demand and excess supply curves. In Figure 3, transfer costs are given by
t12 (t12 >0), with the resulting price lower in the exporting market and higher in the
importing market.
Samuelson (1952) provided a means to solve complex spatial models using the con-
cepts of consumer and producer surplus and a mathematical programing formulation.
Samuelson described the ‘net social pay-off’ from trade as the beneﬁt to producers
from the exporting countries and the beneﬁt to consumers in the importing countries
Figure 3 Trade between two regions. xi is supply in region i, yi is domestic demand in region i
(i=1, 2), ESi is excess supply from region i,E D i is excess demand from region i, t12 is transfer
cost from region 1 to region 2, xij is exports from region i to region j (j=1, 2), Pi is price in
region i and Pa
i is autarky price for region i.
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less the transfer costs (the shaded area in Figure 3). The equilibrium is deﬁned as the
point where the net social payoff is maximised.
The shaded areas above the excess supply and below the excess demand functions
show the welfare effects from trade (Figure 3). Trade causes welfare changes as prices
rise for the exporting region and fall for the importing region. As such there are
associated changes in producer and consumer surplus. As prices rise for the exporter,
producer surplus increases and consumer surplus falls. The opposite is true for an
importing nation.
The approach used in this study draws on the quadratic programming model de-
veloped by Takayama and Judge (1971) and that used by Batterham and MacAulay
(1994). Takayama and Judge (1971) showed that the Samuelson model, based on a
social welfare function, could be solved using what was termed ‘net social monetary
gain’ as the objective function (referred to as the ‘net revenue’ function in Batterham
and MacAulay 1994).
The net social revenue solution is depicted in Figure 4. Under perfect competition, a
transfer services demand function can be implicitly derived from the vertical difference
between the excess supply and excess demand functions. The difference between the




































Figure 4 Representation of a net social revenue solution.
C   Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005328 J. Greenville and T.G. MacAulay
between the regions, with trade occurring as long as transfer costs do not exceed
the difference between the curves. The vertical distance between the curves is the
‘willingnesstopay’fortransferservices,thedemandfortransferservices.Totalrevenue
from transfer services is equal to the total traded volume multiplied by transfer costs.
Under perfect competition, the set of price and transfer cost relationships is required
to hold so that the net social revenue is zero. As such, the model’s objective function is
maximised to give a zero value.
There are three sets of equilibrium conditions essential to the spatial equilibrium
model. First, differences in prices between markets must be less than or equal to the
transfer costs (Samuelson 1952). This is an arbitrage condition and is an extension of
the law of one price. It assumes the products from each region are perfect substitutes
that compete in perfectly competitive markets. Second, demand in any region, yj,i s
equal to local production, xj, plus imports
 
j xij. Third, the supply, xi,i se q u a lt o
exports,
 
i xij, plus demand, yi. The spatial model allows for no excess demand to
exist,butdoesallowexcesssupplyifaslackvariableisincludedinthemodel(MacAulay
1976).
The price-orientated spatial equilibrium used differs from the quantity-oriented
spatial model as outlined by Martin (1981). Although in both models the returns
from trade are maximised (Batterham and MacAulay 1994), price-orientated spatial
equilibrium models reach equilibrium through solution for price levels, which give rise
to quantities produced and traded as the Lagrangian multipliers or the dual variables.
However, in the quantity formulation, the solution is for quantities that subsequently
lead to equilibrium prices as the dual variables.
4.1 Empirical model
A spatial equilibrium model requires data on consumption, production, exports and
imports. These data are combined with elasticities to estimate the supply and demand
functions for the regions in the model. The data sources are the International Iron
and Steel Institute (2002), American Iron and Steel Institute (2002), Ferber (2002)
and International Trade Commission (2002). The data were used to develop a global
balance sheet for steel production for 1999 as this was the most current year in which
a full dataset was available. As such, the results obtained are based on changes from
the 1999 levels. However, export levels to the USA remained stable from 1999 to 2002
(US Census Bureau 2001).
The demand for slab steel is a derived demand, so the elasticity is a function of the
ﬁnal product and the marketing margin involved. The elasticity at the derived level is
less than the elasticity at the retail level as the derived price is lower than the retail
price (Tomek and Robinson 1990).
The steel industry uses many industry-speciﬁc inputs (even labour because of the
specialisednatureofskillsrequired).Itisassumedthatfactorsaremobileupanddown
the production process – that is, from coated products to hot rolled to slab. Although
thereisalargecapitalexpenditurerequiredtomoveintoﬁnishedproducts,andthereis
a large capacity of many integrated steel producers responsible for producing much of
the semiﬁnished products (Crandall 1981), the factor substitution elasticities between
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products are assumed equal, because the inputs used in the production are similar for
the different types of steel.
Information on supply elasticities were unavailable, causing these elasticities to be
estimated. Supply for steel products was assumed to be relatively elastic for all steel
products. Slab steel supply was assumed to be more elastic as it is a primary product,
while the elasticity of the further processed steel was assumed to be more inelastic.
Elasticities for the ‘Rest of World’ region were assumed to be more elastic than for the
othernations.Furthermore,asensitivityanalysis,conductedduetotheseuncertainties,
showed the results were stable to changes in elasticities. A just-in-time supply also was
assumed. This approach ignores inventories, but based on data and other studies (see
Jondrow etal. 1982), the assumption may not be unreasonable for imported steel.
4.1.2 Model structure
The products chosen were slab steel, hot-rolled steel and coated sheet steel because
of their signiﬁcance to the Australian industry. The countries included in the study
were Australia, the USA, Japan, Rest of World importing nations and Rest of World
exporting nations.
As production and consumption of steel can substitute between products, as would
occur with changes in relative prices caused by inconsistent trade barriers, substitution
coefﬁcientswereestimated.Thesecoefﬁcientswerecalculatedforeachsteelproductand
indicatedwhetherproducerswouldrespondtothetariffsbysendingalternateproducts
into the USA. The substitution of one steel product for another for both supply and
demand functions were estimated and inserted into the model (the cross-coefﬁcients
were included in the   and H matrices, see MacAulay 2002). The calculation of the






































where yi is demand for good i, αi is the intercept for demand i and βij is the cross-
coefﬁcient of demand for good i given the price of good j. These coefﬁcients were
requiredforthespatialequilibriummodel.Itwasassumedthatthecross-priceelasticity
for good 1 given the price of good 2 was equal to the cross-price elasticity for good 2
given the price of good 1 (symmetry). The deﬁnition of the relationship between βij
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The advantage of incorporating cross-price terms into the spatial model is that it
allows the three demand and supply equations to act in a dependent manner. This
modiﬁcation means the spatial model can be used to evaluate any range of substi-
tute and complementary goods by allowing price changes from a policy shock to be
determined for the full range of goods.
Tariffs were incorporated into the spatial equilibrium model through the arbitrage
conditions (Takayama and Judge 1971; Koo and Larson 1985; MacAulay 1992). The
application of an ad valorem tariff is analogous to the incorporation of an exchange
rate. Essentially, the ad valorem tariff increases the costs of transfer from one region
to the other (MacAulay 1992). Tariffs are incorporated into the model by means of a
converter matrix Rτ (MacAulay 1992). The arbitrage condition matrix (see MacAulay









where Rτ is in a (n2 ×n2) matrix. For example, if a tariff rate τ ij is applied on the trade
ﬂow from region i to j, then Rτ is a [n2 ×n2]m a t r i xf o rn regions and has φij terms on
the main diagonal for those trade ﬂows with tariffs (see MacAulay 1992).
In the model, the ad valorem tariffs were applied to the steel demand price in the
USA. With a tariff level equal to τ 12 levied on the price of steel products exported
from country 1 to country 2, the arbitrage condition becomes:
(1 − τ12)ρ1 − ρ2 ≤ t12. (6)
Australiasuccessfullynegotiatedanexemptionfor250ktofhot-rolledsheetimports.
This exemption was incorporated into the model. A within-quota tariff of 0percent
was applied to the ﬁrst 250kt of hot-rolled sheet exported to the USA, and an ‘above-
quota’ tariff of 30percent. The incorporation of a quota was done by separating the
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trade ﬂows into the USA into a within-quota trade ﬂow with no tariff and a quota
imposed, and an out-of-quota trade ﬂow with the full tariff rate applied. Slab steel was
subject to a global quota of 5.4 million tonnes, which was implemented in the model
in a similar way.
Transfer costs for the model were estimated by means of unit value differentials. The
differential chosen was calculated as the US domestic price less the export unit value.
This choice was because of the difﬁculties in obtaining transfer costs, as transfer costs
were unavailable for the speciﬁc products examined. The price differences between
export unit values and the US domestic price did correspond with the trade ﬂows, so
that the net exporting regions – Australia and Japan – had lower export unit values
than the US domestic price.
The difference in export unit values and the US domestic price includes not only the
transfer costs but may also include other factors. If exports are concentrated towards
a higher or lower value subproduct, then the export unit value will be skewed towards
thehigherorlowerpricerange.Thismayexaggerateorunderestimatethetransfercost.
Notwithstanding this discrepancy, as well as other factors inﬂuencing the US domestic
price, the transfer costs obtained were the best available given the dataset.
4.2 Results
The results obtained from the spatial equilibrium model are presented in this section.
Theresultsarediscussedintermsofchangesinprices,quantitiesandeconomicsurplus.
In order to calculate the changes in producer and consumer surplus, a line integral
was required. As the demand and supply equations were speciﬁed as a function of own
and cross-prices of the goods in the model, the demand and supply functions were a
plane in a three-dimensional space. The calculation used to determine the consumer
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where βji is the cross-price coefﬁcients of good j for price of good i, βii is the own price
coefﬁcient for good i, αi is the demand intercept of good i and ¯ Pi is the equilibrium
price of good i.
This calculation is an adaptation of the calculation used in MacAulay (1976) with
the use of a line integral set out in Spiegel (1968) and Stewart (1995). A problem
with using line integrals to determine consumer and producer surplus is that they are
path-dependant(seeMacAulay1976);however,forthepurposeofthisstudy,thecross-
coefﬁcients in the demand and supply equations were symmetric; as such the choice of
path makes no difference.
4.2.1 Prices
As a result of the US safeguards, the estimated prices for all products in countries
other than the USA fell as shown in Table 2. The largest fall in price occurred for
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Table 2 Changes in prices paid/received ($US/tonne)
Product Country Pre Post Change Percentage change
Slab Australia 209 207.53 −1.47 −0.701
USA 230 247.42 17.42 7.572
Japan 217 215.53 −1.47 −0.675
Rest of World† 230 228.53 −1.47 −0.637
Rest of World‡,§ 228 226.53 −1.47 −0.643
Hot rolled Australia 290 286.20 −3.80 −1.310
USA 352 390.49 38.49 10.934
Japan 280 276.20 −3.80 −1.357
Rest of World† 352 348.20 −3.80 −1.079
Rest of World‡,§ 306 302.20 −3.80 −1.241
Coated sheet Australia 653 640.11 −12.78 −1.957
USA 677 760.55 83.55 12.341
Japan† 650 637.22 −12.78 −1.965
Rest of World 677 664.22 −12.78 −1.887
Rest of World‡,§ 675 662.22 −12.78 −1.893
†Rest of World importing nation; ‡Rest of World exporting nation; §supply price.
coated sheet steel, in which all countries, with the exception of the USA, experienced a
fall of $US12.78. Despite the uniform drop in absolute price across nations other than
the USA, the relative changes differed within nations. The relative differences in prices
allowed producers (in the model) to substitute between different production activities,
changingthedirectionandcompositionofexports.FortheUSA,thepricelevelsforall
products increased. The smallest increase was seen for slab steel as the barriers placed
on this product were the least restrictive.
Aquasi-rentwasgeneratedforboththeslabandhot-rolledsteelproductquotas,the
quotas were binding. The quasi-rent estimated for Australian exports of slab and hot-
rolled steel was equal to $US18.88 and $US42.28 per tonne, respectively. The global
slab steel quota had an associated rent of $US18.88 per tonne. No nation expanded
beyond the quota with the full 30percent tariff rate.
4.2.2 Production
Totalworldtradeinsteelproductsfellfromapre-safeguardlevelof38.6milliontonnes
of steel to 30.9 million tonnes, close to a 20percent fall in world trade for the three
products examined. Total exports to the USA, post the safeguard actions, represented
5.75 million tonnes (the summed quota levels), a fall from 7.1 million tonnes. Changes
in production and consumption are shown in Table 3.
Total production of slab steel increased by over 61000 tonnes (an increase of 0.01%)
as a result of the measures. The reason for this is linked to the trade diversion effects
caused by the measures, for instance, much of the slab steel originally exported to
the USA was redirected to the Rest of World importing nation. Producers shifted
production away from the hot-rolled and coated sheet products and into slab steel
production, as the slab steel price was the least affected by the move. As such, total
production for hot-rolled and coated sheet products fell globally in response to the
safeguard measures, with production of slab steel increasing.
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Table 3 Production and consumption (million tonnes)
Production Consumption
Region Product Pre Post Change Pre Post Change
Total Slab 587.47 587.53 0.06 587.47 587.53 0.06
Hot rolled 376.19 376.10 −0.08 376.19 376.10 −0.09
Coated sheet 77.90 77.72 −0.19 77.90 77.72 −0.18
Total 1041.56 1041.35 −0.21 1041.55 1041.35 −0.20
Australia Slab 8.054 8.07 0.01 6.51 6.51 0.00
Hot rolled 3.81 3.81 −0.01 3.29 3.30 0.01
Coated sheet 0.646 0.64 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.00
Total 12.51 12.51 0.00 9.91 9.93 0.02
USA Slab 94.425 94.29 −0.13 100.52 99.05 −1.47
Hot rolled 62.58 63.91 1.33 67.54 64.16 −3.38
Coated sheet 18.813 19.45 0.64 20.92 19.45 −1.47
Total 175.82 177.66 1.84 188.98 182.66 −6.32
Japan Slab 94.877 95.14 0.27 89.29 89.23 −0.06
Hot rolled 51.31 51.20 −0.11 33.919 34.08 0.16
Coated sheet 11.298 11.21 −0.09 7.74 7.82 0.08
Total 157.49 157.55 0.07 130.95 131.14 0.18
Rest of World Slab 390.11 390.02 −0.09 391.15 392.73 1.58
Hot rolled 258.48 257.19 −1.29 271.44 274.56 3.12
Coated sheet 47.15 46.41 −0.73 49.12 50.33 1.21
Total 695.74 693.62 −2.12 711.70 717.62 5.92
For the USA, the price of hot-rolled and coated sheet products rose by a greater
percent than seen for slab steel. This change in relative prices created a shift in produc-
tion away from slabs. Interestingly, mini-mill producers who produce such products
will beneﬁt from this increase in price. The higher price received for the transformed
products could create a situation where mini-mills increase their market share to the
disadvantage of integrated producers. This response would undermine the purpose of
the safeguard policy.
Exports to the USA fell signiﬁcantly in the three products examined as a result of
the safeguard measures. Total imports fell by an average of 71percent for all steel
products examined in the study. The reduction in imports equated to a fall in market
share from 7.5percent to 3.3percent for the products examined. Changes in imports
are presented in Table 4.
Table 4 Imports to the USA (million tonnes)
Australia Japan ROW†
Pre Post Change Pre Post Change Pre Post Change
Slab 0.44 0.35 −0.09 0.32 0.15 −0.17 6.33 5.25 −1.07
Hot rolled 0.24 0.25 0.01 0.21 0.00 −0.21 4.51 0.00 −4.51
Coated sheet 0.01 0.00 −0.01 0.17 0.00 −0.17 1.94 0.00 −1.94
†Rest of World importing nation.
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Table 5 Changes in economic surplus ($US millions)
Change in Change in
Region Industry producer surplus consumer surplus
Total Slab 15.17 −34.74
Hot rolled 15.18 −22.61
Coated sheet 15.30 −21.23
Total 45.65 −78.58
Total change in surplus −32.92
Australia Slab −1.24 3.72
Hot rolled −1.97 2.72
Coated sheet −1.49 2.13
Total −4.70 8.57
Total change in surplus 3.87
USA Slab 20.64 −45.85
Hot rolled 21.87 −31.28
Coated sheet 20.26 −26.96
Total 62.78 −104.08
Total change in surplus −41.31
Japan Slab −1.74 4.39
Hot rolled −1.95 2.71
Coated sheet −1.50 2.02
Total −5.20 9.12
Total change in surplus 3.92
Rest of World Slab −2.49 3.01
Hot rolled −2.77 3.24
Coated sheet −1.97 1.57
Total −7.23 7.82
Total change in surplus 0.59
4.2.3 Economic surplus
The effects of the safeguard measures on consumer and producer surplus are shown in
Table 5. For all nations except the USA, producer surplus fell and consumer surplus
increased. The net effect in the Rest of World region was the smallest, as consumers
beneﬁted from the redirected cheaper imports, while producers lost export markets
and local sales. The driver for this result was the partial nature of the analysis.
The results for Australia and Japan are similar and show that total surplus actually
increased. The cause of this increase in total surplus was because of the redirection of
exports away from the USA to the Rest of World importing region and a shift in the
composition of production away from highly protected products. An assumption of
the spatial equilibrium model is that producers, by ignoring the differences in relative
transfer costs, can costlessly shift exports from one region to the other. As a result, the
most viable option for producers in Australia and Japan was to seek alternate markets.
As the elasticity of demand in the Rest of World importing region was relatively more
elastic, the lower price led to greater demand, meaning this region was able to absorb
the shift in exports.
For the USA, the implementation of the safeguard measures led to a net loss
in surplus. The measures did increase domestic production and increased producer
surplus. Despite this, the impact on the US consumers was great, meaning that the
surplus gained for producers was outweighed by the loss incurred by consumers.
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Figure 5 Policy response surfaces for producer revenue in Australia. PR, producer revenue
change in $US100000; T1, slab tariff level; T2, hot-rolled tariff level.
5. Policy responses
Policy response surfaces were formulated in order to examine alternative responses of
Australian steel producers. The policy response surfaces were mapped by means of
a set of varying tariff levels. As there were three products examined, three different
policy response surfaces were estimated, slab–hot rolled, slab–coated sheet and hot
rolled–coated sheet. The policy response surfaces map differing levels of Australian
producer revenue for a range of tariff levels between 0 and 30percent. The tariffs used
to map changes in producer revenue were combinations of 30, 10, 5, 3 and 0percent
for each product (given no concessions).
The producer revenue surface for slab–hot rolled is shown in Figure 5a, where
producer revenue is graphed as change in revenue from the no tariff situation. From
Figure 5a, it can be seen that relaxation in the slab tariff (T1) would have more beneﬁt
to Australian producers than relaxations in other tariffs. Even with a zero tariff level
on hot-rolled steel, the gain to Australian producers is marginal (given a 30% tariff on
slab steel).
With tariff-free imports of slab or hot-rolled steel into the USA, Australian produc-
ers would beneﬁt through the ability to take advantage of the higher domestic price.
Combinations of tariffs for slab steel at 10percent and above yielded a negative result
for Australian producers independent of the hot-rolled steel tariff. The policy surface
estimated for slab–coated sheet products is shown in Figure 5b. The results are similar
to those seen for the slab–hot-rolled policy response functions as tariff-free access, for
slab steel yields the greatest beneﬁts for producers. In the case of hot rolled–coated
sheet, tariff-free access for either coated sheet or hot-rolled steel would still mean that
theAustraliansteelindustrywouldbeworseoffthanwiththezerotariffposition.With
zero tariff access for hot-rolled steel and a full tariff rate on coated sheet, Australian
producers are only marginally better off (Figure 5c).
An implication from the above analysis is that the best outcome for Australian
producers is to have some form of preferential access to the US market, assuming the
concessionwasgivenonslabsteel(fromtheconsumers’pointofview,thebestposition
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for Australia is opposite to this and would be at the lowest points in Figure 5a–c). This
conclusionappearsobvious,buttheimplicationsofthecross-elasticitiessignallingthat
the products were in some way substitutes for the purpose of the study, mean that only
one product would need to have tariff-free access into the US market for beneﬁts to
ﬂow to the producers of the other products in the study. The increase in price received
in Australia would also place upward pressure on the prices of the other goods. The
concept of total elasticity is a useful way to envisage the overall effect (Tomek and
Robinson 1990).
6. Concluding comments
The impacts of the safeguard measures on the world steel industry can be viewed
through examining changes in producer and consumer surplus. It was seen from the
results that the initial position was more efﬁcient for the global steel market because of
the negative change in total surplus that has occurred with the safeguard tariffs. It can
be said that free trade provides greater overall beneﬁts, while trade protection leads to
short-term beneﬁts for protected steel producers.
Total surplus for the global steel market is seen to fall by $US32.92 million because
of the imposition of the safeguard actions. Beneﬁts for steel producers in the USA
(measured in the form of producer surplus) increased by $US62.78 million, with losses
in consumer surplus equal to $US104.08 million. As such, a more efﬁcient policy to
enable the US steel industry to restructure would be one aimed at market reforms, and
not trade protection.
A ﬁgure excluded from the change in producer and consumer surplus is the transfer
that occurs with the impositions of tariffs and quotas. The US government may receive
an income stream from these protection measures depending on the structure of the
quota. The USA is a large importer, and as such, can beneﬁt from the imposition of
trade barriers. The effect of the trade-distorting measures used – tariffs and quotas –
led to a fall in world price. This fall allows the US government to capture some surplus
from the world steel market. With the inclusion of the surplus from quota revenue,
the US economy would actually gain (quasi-quota rent can be viewed as a surplus
transfer) equal to $US77.69 million.
The beneﬁts to the steel market would only increase if the quota revenue were
transferred to this market (which may be the case). If this quasi-rent is placed into
treasury,dependingonthestructureofthequota,therevenuecollectedmaygotoother
causes, leading to a net loss in the market. This rent also ignores administration costs,
which are usually high with quotas due to difﬁculties in collection. With appropriate
permit controls, it is possible that the quota rent may not be collected by the USA, and
in fact be collected by world exporters, or importing ﬁrms depending on the degrees
of market power or levels of regulation.
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viewed by the US government that this policy was best – either the costs to the market
areworthpaying,orthatgovernmentrevenueisfavouredoveroutlays–theresponseby
the steel industry may not be what the government is after. It has been seen throughout
history that the US government has intervened in the steel market whenever steel
producers were affected adversely by imports. This continual intervention has meant
that steel producers have relied on the government if the economic situation turned
against them. This policy has caused unproductive practices and large excess capacity
to remain in the industry. The question becomes, would this be any different this time?
The results obtained from the analysis of the safeguard actions show an unequal
increase in the price of the examined steel products within the USA, skewed towards
coated sheet and hot-rolled steel. Both integrated steel producers and mini-mills pro-
duce these two products. The safeguard policy was primarily aimed at the larger
integrated producers because of their political signiﬁcance and the fact that it was
these producers that were most under threat from the surge in imports. With the higher
prices favouring the products that mini-mills produce, the safeguard barriers may not
help the integrated producers, but allow mini-mills to capture more of the US market
at the expense of the integrated producers.
The results obtained here differed to those which were seen in the world steel market
becauseof thepartial equilibriumnatureof theanalysis. In reality,theeffectofChina’s
strong growth fuelled world demand for steel during the period of safeguard tariffs,
causing world prices to increase. As such, exporting nations did not have to face lower
steel prices as a result of the safeguard measures as they were able to shift exports
towards China.
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